Robots' Safety by Pirttilahti, Juho
  
Juho Pirttilahti 
Robots’ Safety 
 
Thesis  
Autumn 2016 
School of Technology 
Automation engineering 
2 
 
SEINÄJOKI UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES 
Thesis abstract 
Faculty: School of Technology 
Degree Programme: Automation Engineering 
Specialisation: Machine Automation 
Author: Juho Pirttilahti 
Title of thesis: Robots’ Safety 
Supervisors: Jarkko Pakkanen, Michael Möckel 
Year:2016  Number of pages: 53 Number of appendices: 1 
Human-robot-collaboration is considered one of the answers to the flexible needs 
of more and more customizing manufacturing. Its purpose is to fit together the best 
qualities of both human and robots to reduce the cost and time of manufacturing. 
One of the key questions in this area is safety. 
The purpose of this thesis was to define the required safety functionality of cartesian, 
delta and articulated robots based on the current machine needs. Using the future 
robotic concepts investigate and propose using the Schneider Electric portfolio the 
most appropriate architecture as well as the interconnection to the robotic world. 
The architectures were constructed by using Schneider Electrics machine safety 
products and the PHARO safety laser scanner manufactured by ReeR. Also the risk 
assessment example and general guidelines for risk reduction process for this type 
of application were demonstrated.  
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SEINÄJOEN AMMATTIKORKEAKOULU  
Opinnäytetyön tiivistelmä 
Koulutusyksikkö: Tekniikan yksikkö 
Tutkinto-ohjelma: Automaatiotekniikka 
Suuntautumisvaihtoehto: Koneautomaatio 
Tekijä: Juho Pirttilahti 
Työn nimi: Ihminen-robotti-yhteistyön turvallisuus 
Ohjaajat: Jarkko Pakkanen, Michael Möckel 
Vuosi: 2016  Sivumäärä:  53 Liitteiden lukumäärä: 1 
Ihminen-robotti-yhteistyötä pidetään yhtenä vastauksena kasvaviin vaatimuksiin 
koneellisessa valmistuksessa. Yhteistyön tarkoituksena on liittää sekä työntekijän 
että robotin parhaat ominaisuudet yhteen ja täten tuoda tuotantoon tarvittavaa 
joustavuutta ja vähentää tuotantoon kulunutta aikaa ja rahaa. Yhtenä 
avainkysymyksenä ihminen-robotti-yhteistyössä nousee esiin turvallisuus. 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena oli määrittää cartesian, delta ja articulated- 
robottityypeille tarvittava turvallisuuteen liittyvä toiminallisuus ottaen huomioon 
nykyisten koneiden vaatimukset. Tulevaisuuden konsepteja käyttäen tarkoituksena 
oli tutkia ja ehdottaa sopivin arkkitehtuuri hyödyntämällä Schneider Electricin 
tuotevalikoimaa sekä osoittaa yhteys robotiikan maailmaan. 
Arkkitehtuurit luotiin Schneider Electricin koneturvallisuustuotteita sekä ReeR:in 
valmistamaa PHARO- turvalaserskanneria käyttäen. Esimerkki riskien arvioinnista 
ja yleiset ohjeet riskien vähennysprosessiin tämän tyyppiseen arkkitehtuuriin on 
myöskin demonstroitu tässä opinnäytetyössä. 
 
 
 
Asiasanat: yhteistyö, robotti, koneturvallisuus, turvalaserskanneri, riskien arviointi, 
yhteistyö metodi 
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Terms and Abbreviations 
Collaboration Interactive cooperation of two or more persons or ma-
chines. 
ISO The International Organization for Standardization. 
Manipulator Used to move material without direct contact. Simpler ver-
sion of a robot. 
OSSD Output Signal Switching Device 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
Teach pendant Control interface for a worker for the motion programming 
of a robot. 
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1 Introduction 
History of the robotics goes back to the year 1954 when George C. Devol applied 
the patent for a programmable manipulator. The model called ‘’Unimate’’ made and 
designed by Devol and Joseph. F Engelbeer was commissioned at General Motors 
in 1962. From that day, the robotics has been quickly adapting in the industrial man-
ufacturing and nowadays collaborative robots are examples of this development in 
the field of technology. 
Collaborative robots have become solutions to applications where competencies 
from both human and robot must be applied for the best result with minimal costs. 
This considers situations where full labour or a fully automated solution is not pos-
sible to be commissioned or it is found ineffective. It could be summarized, that hu-
man-robot-collaboration is giving dynamic semi-automation solutions for production. 
Human is ahead in flexibility, fast adaptation to changing tasks and decision making 
whereas robots are tireless, powerful and could handle dangerous items and thus 
be commissioned to dangerous places. By using collaborative applications, the 
strengths of both a human and a robot could be used to improve production effi-
ciency, quality, capacity, employee environment, cost and cycle times. Also, manu-
facturing of complex and several work phases including products in small quantities 
are more efficient when comparing fully automated and fully manual production. 
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1.1 Schneider Electric Automation GmbH 
Schneider Electric Automation GmbH is a subsidiary of Schneider Electric SE, which 
is a French originated multinational company founded in 1836. The company spe-
cialties consist of power management, process & machine management, IT room 
management, building management, security management, industrial software de-
sign, simulation and optimisation, industrial automation, control and safety systems 
and instrumentation. The company has over 185 000 employees in over 100 coun-
tries.  (Schneider Electric 2016a.) 
Figure 1: Company logo (Schneider Electric 2016a) 
 
Schneider Electric Automation GmbH, based in Marktheidenfeld is the international 
headquarter of the Machine Solutions and System Consistency- sector. The globally 
active company develops and produces products and services by approximately 
400 employees from over 26 different nations in particular hardware and software 
products for automation solutions in machine and plant engineering. (Schneider 
Electric 2016a.) 
1.2 Thesis background, goals and structure 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate and study the safety methods used in the 
collaborative robotics. By using this information, example application for demonstra-
tion purposes using the safety components and devices manufactured by ReeR and 
Schneider Electric was constructed.   
This thesis consists of five main parts, which are; introduction, theory, technical in-
vestigation, an example of risk assessment and a summary and cogitation.  
12 
 
2 Theory 
2.1 Clarification for the terminology 
There are several different ways in naming of human collaborative robots and for 
the general clarification and for this thesis the following terminology is applied: 
Force limited robots are specially designed to work alongside the humans. Force 
and torque are monitored and in case of a contact the robot is stopped. (Robotiq 
2015.) 
Collaborative robots are designed to work alongside the human, but are not neces-
sarily force-limited. This is also considering applications where standard industrial 
robot is made collaborative by external devices or technologies. (Robotiq 2015.) 
Cobot is a slang term describing a collaborative robot and could be used to describe 
both of the previous, but needs corrective determination alongside. (Robotiq 2015.) 
2.2 Machine safety in general 
With a short ethical cogitation, it could be said that there is a clear moral obligation 
against a situation where the industrial machine is harming a person. The harm 
caused by an accident is not limited only to the injury of the worker, but also has 
financial impact to insurance costs, lost production, damaged machine, lost custom-
ers and even loss of reputation of the company. (Schneider Electric 2009.)   
To prevent this, it is important to recognize, plan and supervise safety aspects from 
the start, already at the designing phase, until the decommissioning and scrapping 
of the machine. The risk assessment has an important role when commissioning 
human-robot applications. The basic risk assessment consists of recognizing the 
system’s scope, identifying risk sources, estimating and evaluating the risk and de-
termining  these attributes to conduct the needed risk reduction process (Schneider 
Electric 2009.). An example of the risk assessment for a constructed example ap-
plication layout will be introduced in section 4.  
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2.3 Introduction to the standards  
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the standards for the safety of machinery (Schneider Electric 
2009, 12.) 
Type A standards are basic safety standards which give the basic concepts, princi-
ples for design and general aspects that can be applied to all machinery. (Schneider 
Electric 2009.) 
Type B standards are generic safety standards which are dealing with one safety 
aspect or one type of safeguard that can be used across a wide range of machinery. 
Breaking this down to Type B1 and Type B2 standards, where B1 standards con-
centrate on particular safety aspects, for example, contact surfaces, temperature 
and noise. B2 standards consider safeguarding methods, for example two-hand 
controls, interlocking devices, pressure sensitive devices and guards. (Schneider 
Electric 2009.) 
Type C standards are machine safety standards which consider safety requirements 
for a particular machine or group of machines. (Schneider Electric 2009.) 
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The following table is explaining the main standard structures which were used dur-
ing the investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supportive- type of standards consist of Technical Specification (TS) and Technical 
Report (TR) which provide more detailed information according to the subject dis-
cussed in the standards. ISO TS 15066 is introduced better later in this thesis and 
ISO TR 14121-2 are giving practical guidance for risk assessment for a wide variety 
of machines. It could be used with ISO 12100 when implementing various tools and 
methods for each step of the risk assessment and risk reduction process.  
 
ISO 12100 
ISO TS 15066 
ISO 10218-1 ISO 10218-2 
ISO 62061 
A 
B 
C 
ISO 13849-1 
ISO TR 14121-2 Supportive 
                                                    Table 1: Standard structure 
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2.4 Safeguarding devices 
This section covers typical devices which are used for safeguarding hazardous ar-
eas in manufacturing machines.  
2.4.1 Light curtains 
With a light curtain, user putting hands, fingers or feet to a hazardous area could be 
prevented, because distances between light beams are short. This is called resolu-
tion. Resolution limit for the fingers is 14mm, for the hands 30mm and for the body 
protection 40mm.  (Malm 2008, 19-20.) 
 
For basic principle, the light curtain consists of several photoelectric sensors. As-
sembling several transmitters and receivers close to each other requires some con-
sideration of interruption errors between light beams. To eliminate this error usually 
only one transmitter receiver pair is activated at the time. The frequency in activation 
between the light beams is high and reaction time is some milliseconds. (Malm 
2008, 19-20.) 
Figure 3: Principle of the light curtain  
(Clearwater Tech 2016.) 
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2.4.2 Safety mats 
The working principle of this safety device is mechanical. The output from the mat 
is generated when the operator steps on it. The technology in the mat is based on 
compressed air, optical fibre or electromechanical solutions. Mats are usually made 
of industrial rubber with a thickness between 10 and 15mm. (Malm 2008, 20-21.) 
Figure 4: Principle of the safety mat by Tokyo Sensor (T.J. Solution 2012.) 
 
2.4.3 Safety limit switches 
Whenever safety fences are applied, it is necessary to ensure that a human is able 
to trespass the hazardous zone only when the machine is stopped or the risk inside 
the hazardous zone is not exceeding the measured limits. There are lot of options 
for safety limit switches in the market (Malm 2008, 22.)  
Solenoid interlock switches prevent the gate opening by using a lock key, which is 
attached to the frame of the door. The switch could be set to open after a determined 
delay or signal. (Malm 2008, 22-23.) 
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Coded magnetic switches are compact solutions for gate monitoring. The device 
consists of a small magnet and a reading device which detects if the magnet is not 
in its perimeter and sends a stopping signal to the machine. The coding is imple-
mented to make the bypassing of the switch harder. (Malm 2008, 23.) 
2.4.4 Enabling switch 
Enabling switch, also known as a ’dead man switch, uses a 3-state pressing switch 
to recognize and cut the signal if not pressed at all or if pressed too hard. It is used 
to gain access to the work cell’s hazardous zones when the machine is running with 
a reduced speed. Teach pendants used to program an industrial robot’s movement 
are equipped with enabling switches. (Schneider Electric 2009.) 
Figure 5: Example application executed with safety limit switches (Rockwell 
Automation 2016.) 
Figure 6: Example of an enabling 
switch (Schneider Electric 2009, 26.) 
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2.5 Standards regarding safety in collaborative robotics 
Regarding safety in robots there are three standards to implement; 
ISO 10218-1 concentrates on safety precautions in design and the functionality of 
the robot itself and concerns more the manufacturer than the commissioner. The 
main points of the standard regarding this thesis are:  
4 Hazard identification and risk assessment 
5.3.5 Single point of control 
5.4.2 Performance requirement 
5.5 Robot stopping functions 
5.6.2 Reduced speed control operation 
5.10 Collaborative operation requirements 
5.10.4 Speed and separation monitoring 
5.10.5 Power and force limiting by inherent design or control 
5.12.2 Mechanical and electro-mechanical axis limiting devices 
5.12.3 Safety-rated soft axis and space limiting 
Annex A: List of significant hazards 
Annex F: Means of verification of the safety requirements and measures 
ISO 10218-2 is giving guidelines for integrating robotics to manufacturing. Consid-
ered main points regarding this thesis are:  
4.2 Layout design 
4.3.2 Limits of the robot system 
5.4.2 Establishing safeguarded and restricted spaces 
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5.5.1 Perimeter safeguarding 
5.5.2 Access for interventions 
5.6.3.4 Manual reset, start/restart and unexpected start-up 
5.7.4 Hand guiding of robot systems (collaborative robots) 
5.10 Safeguarding 
5.10.3 Minimum (safety) distances 
5.11 Collaborative robot operation 
6 Verification and validation of safety requirements and protective measures 
Annex B: Relationship of standards to related protective devices 
Annex C: Safeguarding material entry and exit points 
Annex E: Conceptual applications of collaborative robots 
Annex G: Means of verification of the safety requirements and measures 
ISO TS 15066 is a technical specification which was released in February 2016 to 
fulfil and specify the collaborative safety with more detailed information of designing 
collaborative application in entity. 
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Also biomechanical limits of the human are tested in the University of Mainz in Ger-
many and the results cover the maximum force and pressure limits for 29 body ar-
eas. (Robotiq.)  
 
 
Figure 7: Biomechanical limit values (ISO TS 
15066:2016, 24.) 
Figure 8:Biomechanical limits values continued (ISO TS 
15066:2016, 25.) 
21 
 
2.6 Used safety technologies with collaborative robots 
In this section the usual safety measures from the current market are introduced 
with example applications. 
2.6.1 Safety laser scanner 
A laser scanner is meant to detect an approaching object by optical sensing and to 
send a stop signal to the machine before the object reaches the hazard zone. (Malm 
2008, 23)   
For example the PHARO- safety laser scanner manufactured by ReeR is based on 
the principle of time-of-flight- measurement. It sends out very short pulses of light 
(S in the picture below). At the same time an electronic stopwatch is started and it 
measures when the light it is reflected and received by the safety laser scanner (E). 
Based on the time between sending and transmitting (Δt) the scanner calculates the 
distance to the object. The mirror rotates at constant speed (2) that directs the light 
pulses for cover an arc of 190°. By the mirror angle value, the scanner measures 
the object’s direction. Based on the distance and direction of the object, the scanner 
determines the objects’ position. (ReeR 2015.) 
 
Figure 9: ReeR PHARO function principle (ReeR 2015, 14.) 
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There is a different number of field sets and field configurations available within the 
scanners in the market. ReeR PHARO is equipped with two fields, which are a Pro-
tective field (1, in the picture below) and a Warning field, stated as number 2 in the 
Figure 10 below. (ReeR 2015.) 
 
Figure 10: Fields of ReeR PHARO (ReeR 2015, 15.) 
The scanner’s functionality is described in more detail in the section Technical in-
vestigation. 
2.6.2 Tactile skin 
This method uses the layer built on the robot which is consisting of sensors. These 
sensors could be used to measure pressure and proximity. In the following picture 
the tactile skin is used at the same time to control the robot arm and ensure safety. 
Fraunhofer’s application consists of pressure and capacitive sensors which are used 
to measure location, strength and area of contact. (Fraunhofer 2014b.) 
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          Figure 11: Tactile skin application by Fraunhofer (Fraunhofer 2014b.)  
2.6.3 Axis monitoring 
In most force limited robots in the market, for example models manufactured by 
KUKA, Universal Robotics, Rethink Robotics, there are sensors installed straight 
into the joints of the robots’ arms to monitor forces and torques. The sensor values 
can be compared to the limit values and robot will be stopped if the values exceed 
enough. One implemented method is the overcurrent measurement. (Robotiq. 
2015.) 
An example of a robot representing this technology has been manufactured by 
KUKA and introduced later in the section Safety methods for collaborative robots . 
2.6.4 Machine vision 
One basic principle with safety devices is that they react to changes in a continuous 
signal. The safety device’s machine vision is based on reacting to changes in the 
picture of the camera and then giving out a stopping signal. In situations when the 
lens is gathering dirt or the system starts to get inaccurate, the functionality of safety 
system can be ensured. (Malm 2008, 30-31.) 
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SafetyEYE manufactured by Pilz is based on this technology. The system consists 
of three CMOS cameras and the device is able to provide a 3D perception. (Pilz 
2006.) 
Figure 12: Areas of SafetyEYE. (Pilz 2006.) 
2.6.5 Safety methods for collaborative operations 
In the technical specification ISO TS 15066 are stated 4 different possibilities to 
ensure safety during collaborative situations. The methods are safety-rated moni-
tored stop, hand guiding, speed and separation monitoring and power and force 
limiting. The methods can be used separately or the collaborative solution can be 
constructed of a combination of these methods. (ISO TS 15066:2016, 8.)  
The Safety-rated monitored stop- method means ceasing the robot’s motion before 
an operator enters the collaborative workspace to interact with the robot system and 
complete the work cycle’s task. If the operator is not present in the collaborative 
workspace, the robot may operate non-collaboratively. When the robot is in the col-
laborative workspace, the safety-rated monitored function is active and the robot is 
stopped, and the operator is permitted to enter the collaborative workspace. The 
robot can resume the work cycle without any additional intervention only after the 
operator is no longer present in the collaborative workspace. (ISO TS 15066:2016, 
8.) 
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The logic is illustrated in the following figure:  
Figure 13: Truth table for safety-rated monitored stop operations (ISO TS 
15066:2016, 8.) 
The technical investigation appearing later in this thesis is based on this collabora-
tive method.  
In the Hand guiding- method a hand-operated device is used to transmit motion 
commands to the robot system by the operator. Before the operator is permitted to 
enter the collaborative workspace and conduct the task, the robot achieves a safety-
rated monitored stop command. The task is carried out by manually actuating the 
guiding devices located at or near the robot’s end-effector. (ISO TS 15066: 2016, 
9.)  
An example application of this method is introduced by Fraunhofer, which is aiming  
at robot-assisted sensitive hand-guiding of heavy workpieces. The concept is using 
a steering-wheel-like two hand enabling switch. The implemented tactile sensors 
permit 3-stage sensing to reduce hazardous situations. The device has been in-
stalled straight to the tool center point (TCP) of the robot. (Fraunhofer 2014a.) 
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In the Speed and separation- method, the robot and operator may be at the same 
time in the collaborative workspace. The risk has been lowered by constantly main-
taining at least the protective separation distance between the operator and robot. 
When in motion, the robot never gets closer to the operator than the protective sep-
aration distance.  (ISO TS 15066:2016, 10-11.) 
Example from Fraunhofer is using projector and camera technology for generation 
and monitoring safe areas. The area is directly projected into the environment. The 
safe areas are changing dynamically regarding to position, size and shape. Stop is 
initiated when the projector beam is disrupted. (Fraunhofer 2014a.)  
Figure 14 Hand guiding device by Fraunhofer 
(Fraunhofer 2014a.) 
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In the Power and force limiting- method, physical contact between the robot system 
and an operator can occur either intentionally or unintentionally. Power and force 
limited collaborative operation requires robots specifically designed for this particu-
lar type of operation. Either through inherently safe means in the robot or through a 
safety-related control system, risk reduction is achieved, by keeping hazards asso-
ciated with the robot system below threshold limit values that are determined by the 
risk assessment. (ISO TS 15066:2016, 15.) 
  
Figure 15 Example of Speed and separation monitoring by Fraunhofer 
(Fraunhofer 2014a.) 
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2.7 Safety functions for motions 
Safety functions for the motion are different monitoring situations for example for the 
servomotor. By these functions the dangerous speeds and torques are avoided. 
(Schneider Electric.) 
Safety functions used in application in this thesis are Safe torque off, Safe Stop 2 
and Safe limited speed. (Schneider Electric.) 
Safe torque off (abbreviation STO) is the most common safety function and are 
found most drives as standard. This function ensures that energy generating torque 
is eliminated and therefore prevents unintentional start of the motor. Drive free-
wheels down to stop condition when STO is enabled. (Schneider Electric.) 
Safe stop 2 (abbreviation SS2) is causing rapid motor stop safely and keeps moni-
toring the standstill position of the motor. The torque is ‘’kept’’ in the motor to enable 
it quickly again when necessary. (Schneider Electric.)  
Figure 16 Collaborative robot based on Power and force limiting method by KUKA. 
(KUKA) 
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Safe limited speed (abbreviation SLS) function ensures determined speed limits of 
the drive. When the speed is reduced to the right level by the program, the SLS 
supervises, that the limit is not exceeded. Fault is activated if the limit is exceeded. 
(Schneider Electric.)  
Figure 17: STO safety function 
Figure 18: SS2 Safety function 
Figure 19: SLS Safety function 
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3 Technical investigation 
3.1 Foreword 
The technical investigation took place in Schneider Electrics factory in 
Marktheidenfeld from 21st of March to 21st of June. The main goals were to imple-
ment ReeR PHARO safety laser scanner with XPSMCM- programmable safety con-
troller and TM5- safety logic, construct an example application basing on the Safety-
rated monitored stop theory and to make a risk assessment example. 
3.2 Constructed architectures 
3.2.1 Components 
Main components in the example architectures were PHARO- safety laser scanner 
and components manufacture by Schneider Electric; Preventa XPSMCM- safety 
modular controller, PacDrive TM5- safety logic controller, PacDrive 3 Logic Motion 
Controller LMC and Thesys- contactor. 
ReeR PHARO PHR 332 is having 2 monitored safety zones and 2 monitoring cases 
available. The functionality of the safety zones and monitoring cases is introduced 
with example application later in this thesis. PHAROs Protective field could reach 
up to 4 meters. Warning field could reach theoretically 49 meters, but detection is 
dependent of the reflectivity. (for example objects with 20% reflectivity can be de-
tected in radius up to 20m). Scanner is configured with the User Configuration Soft-
ware (UCS).(ReeR 2015) 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
XPSMCM- safety modular controller is configurable controller for monitoring multiple 
safety functions as example emergency stop and guard monitoring. XPSMCM is 
configured via program called SoSafe Configurable. Controller is expandable and 
different modules are available for example to support fieldbus communication. 
(Schneider Electric 2015.) 
 
PacDrive TM5- safety logic controller is ‘’supervision’’ system for the output devices 
connected to the LMC and is used to create embedded safety systems. Also non-
safety blocks could be attached, but they are not part of the safety system. Schnei-
der Electrics program SoMachine Motion includes SoSafe Programmable which is 
used to configure TM5- system. (Schneider Electric 2010.) 
Figure 18: ReeR PHARO Safety laser scanner 
(ReeR) 
Figure 19: XPSMCM safety modular controller with expansion modules 
(Schneider Electric 2015.) 
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PacDrive 3 LMC Logic Motion Controller implements both PLC and motion functions 
and is used with PacDrive 3 robotics to control Schneider Electrics cartesian and 
delta robot models. LMC is programmed via SoMachine Motion.(Schneider Electric 
2009.)  
 
Figure 20: Example of connected TM5 safety logic system 
Figure 21: PacDrive 3 LMC (Schneider Electric 2016b.) 
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3.2.2 Example architecture 1 
The first example architecture is consisting of PHARO- safety laser scanner, XPS-
MCM and Thesys- contactor. Target usage is for simple applications. The output 
could be in example robot controller and the connection is done by hardwiring be-
tween XPSMCM and the controller. 
The principle for safety function is the input, processing and output as in structure 
picture below. 
 
 
 
 
The testing succeeded with both automatic and manual restart. When the object 
was in the Warning field the indicator light ‘’OBJECT IN THE WARNING FIELD’’ 
was on and when object proceeded to the Protective field, the power was off from 
the contactor. Usage of automatic restart is prohibited in the situations where the 
user could exit from the detection zone to the hazardous zone. 
Figure 23: Wiring diagram of the architecture 
Figure 22: Input - Processing - Output 
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3.2.3 Example architecture 2 
The second example architecture is consisting of PHARO- laser scanner as the in-
put device, TM5 as the supervision device, LMC as the processing device and Har-
mony XVMB1R6AG- light tower as the output device. All other devices are com-
municating with Sercos 3 bus, except the connection between PHARO and TM5, 
which is hardwired. 
 
Figure 24: Example architecture 2 
 
The picture below is demonstrating the functionality of the architecture from safety 
side of view. The full program block used in the architecture in SoSafe Programma-
ble is found from the appendices. 
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OSSD1 and OSSD2 in the picture are standing for the redundant output signals of 
the safety scanner. Emergency stop 1 (Estop1) and Emergency stop 2 (Estop2) are 
extra safety functions and connected for the testing purposes. 
The architecture demonstration workflow was as follows; 
1. The power is connected to the system. The scanner is in 
normal state and output needs to be restarted. 
2. After restart, the output is also in the normal state. 
3. When the operator or the object interrupts the Warning 
field of the scanner, the Safe Limited Speed (SLS)- safety 
function is activated for the output. 
4.  When the operator or the object interrupts the Protective 
field of the scanner, the Safe Stop 2 (SS2)- safety function 
is activated for the output. 
Figure 25:Simplified safety functionality of the architecture. 
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5. When the object exits both the Protective field and Warning 
field, the scanner returns to the normal state and output 
needs restart. 
6. After restarting the output the system returns to the normal 
operation. 
3.3 Example application  
In this section, the example application basing on the Example architecture 2 is 
demonstrated. 
3.3.1 Layout 
The picture of the example applications layout could be found below. 
 
Figure 26: Application layout 
Area A is standing for the conveyor which inputs material to the work cell, likewise 
Area B is the output conveyor. 
Area C is standing for the Collaborative workspace as mentioned in the Safety-rated 
monitored stop- method. In Area C, the Protective field (coloured yellow in the 3D- 
picture) and Warning field (coloured red in the 3D. picture) of the safety scanner are 
active. 
Laser scanner
Detection area
Protective field
Collaborative workspace
RobotArea A
Warning field
Area B
Machine
 exit point
Machine
 entry point
Area C
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Machine exit point is standing for the area, where robot gives the object to the op-
erator and Machine entry point is the area where operator returns the object to the 
task cycle. 
The 3D- picture of the layout is found below. 
 
Figure 27: Application layout in 3D 
3.3.2 Workflow demonstration 
The work cycle starts normally after machine restarts and robot starts to move ob-
jects from Area A conveyor to the Area B conveyor. 
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The collaborative operation starts when the operator enters to the scanners Warning 
field. The Safe limited speed (SLS)- safety function is activated and robot speed 
reduced. 
In Step 2, after the robot is finished the work cycle by handling the object to the Area 
B from tool head, it picks up the object from Area A and transfers it to Machine exit 
point. 
 
Figure 29: Example application: Step 2 
Figure 28: Example application: Step 1 
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In Step 3, when the robot is left from the collaborative area, the field set of the safety 
scanner switches and lets operator to go pick up the object without interfering the 
Protective field. The operator does the needed operations for the object, repair or 
inspection in the Warning field area while the robot continues the work cycle with 
reduced speed. 
   Figure 30: Example application: Step 3 
In Step 4, the operator has finished the needed operation to the object and returns 
the object to the Machine entry point. During this step, the operator has to interrupt 
the Protective field and the Safe Stop 2 (SS2)- safety function is activated. This 
could be prevented by choosing safety laser scanner with more field sets available. 
Figure 31: Example application: Step 4 
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In Step 5, after manual machine restart, the robot picks up object from the Machine 
entry point and puts it to the conveyor in Area B. After that the work cell is returned 
to the normal work cycle operation. 
 
Figure 32: Example application: Step 5 
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4 Example of risk assessment  
In this section, the general guidelines for the risk reduction process for example 
applications collaborative method are given. 
4.1 General risk reduction process 
The risk reduction structure is introduced in the ISO 12100- standard.  
 
Figure 33: General risk reduction process structure with example usage of the 
standards  
4.2 Determine system scope 
The section 4.3. from ISO 12018-2 could be used to determine the systems scope. 
In this section Use limits and Space limits of the system are stated. For Use limits, 
the analysis of process sequences including manual intervention is executed. For 
the example application it is found from the Workflow demonstration- section. Also, 
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the investigation to the required machine movement range, required space for op-
erator tasks and other human intervention and required access for Space limits sec-
tion is analyzed in the Workflow demonstration- section. 
4.3 Identify risk sources 
For example hazard identification there are 3 important points which are ISO 10218-
2:2011; Annex A, ISO TS 15066; 4.3.2 Hazard Identification and ISO TS 15066; 
4.3.3 Task Identification. 
ISO 10218-2:2011 Annex A is including results from the hazard identification as 
executed in ISO 12100 and is giving guideline to recognize significant hazards. 
ISO TS 15066; 4.3.2 Hazard identification is describing the structure and minimum 
requirements for the hazard identification execution. 
ISO TS 15066; 4.3.3 Task identification is giving guidelines to identify the foresee-
able task and hazard combinations and helps with structuring collaborative opera-
tions. 
One risk in the example application is if the worker approaches too fast towards to 
the hazardous zone of the work cell and gets in the way of the moving robot as 
demonstrated in the picture below. 
Figure 34: Too fast approach of the operator 
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4.4 Risk estimation and evaluation 
For risk estimation and breaking the phenomena down to values, the following struc-
ture could be used as stated in the ISO 12100. 
 
Figure 35: Risk Estimation structure form the ISO 12100 (Schneider Electric 
2009.) 
For numerical determination for example ISO 62061 could be used. In the following 
Figure the applicable points to the example hazard are pointed out. 
Figure 36: Risk analysis table (Schneider 2009.) 
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To continue risk estimation by ISO 62061 the determination of class of the probabil-
ity (CI) of harm needs to be calculated. CI is calculated with the following formula; 
 
 
With calculated values, the CI is 8. Together with the severity of the harm (Se), the 
value could be assigned to the SIL assignment matrix found from the standard. The 
red box is standing for the estimation result. (ISO 62061.) 
 
Figure 37: SIL assigment matrix (ISO  
Also, the same kind of table could be found from the ISO TR 14121-2 without the 
SIL values, but giving out the level of risk as the table in ISO 62061. 
 
Also for the estimation diagram from ISO 13849-1 could be used. In the table, S 
stands for the severity of injury, F for frequency of and exposure to hazard and P for 
the possibility of avoiding the hazard or limiting harm. After conducting the Perfor-
mance Level Required (PLr) indicates high-risk value. (ISO 13849-1:2008, 52.) 
Table 2: Risk estimation table. (ISO/TR 14121-2:2012, 18) 
𝐹𝑟 + Pr + 𝐴𝑣 = 𝐶𝐼 
Equation 1: CI- class calculation (ISO 62061.) 
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Figure 38: Risk estimation graph (ISO 13849-1:2008, 52.) 
4.5 Risk reduction process 
For the risk reduction to this type of risk, point b from the ISO TS 15066, 4.3.4 could 
be applied. ‘’Protective measures that prevent personnel from accessing hazard or 
control the hazards by bringing them to a safe state (e.g. stopping, limiting forces, 
limiting speed) before and the operator can access or be exposed to the hazard.’’ 
(ISO TS 15066:2016.) 
To conduct the system stopping time needs to be calculated. For calculating the 
signal inside the example architecture 2, SoSafe Programmable is including Safety 
Figure 39: System stopping time (Schneider Electric 2010.) 
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Response Time Calculator, which is used to calculate signal processing time inside 
the modules. 
For the TM5-input module, where Protective fields OSSDs were connected to the 
TM5- output module, the processing time was 49 milliseconds. The response time 
for the ReeR PHARO with a 150mm resolution is 0,06 seconds and for the example  
stopping time estimation for the robot with a payload of 10 kilograms it is 0,4 sec-
onds. In total, the stopping time of the example architecture is 0,509 seconds. 
For the safety distance (S) calculation the following formula could be used; 
 
   
 
Here K is the approach speed, Tm is the stopping or run-down time of the machine, 
Ts is the response time of the PHARO, Zg is the general safety supplement 
(100mm), Zr is a supplement for a measurement error related to the reflection and 
C is a supplement for the prevention of reaching over. (ReeR 2015, 38.) 
For given values, the result for the safety distance for risk is 2 114,4mm. By con-
ducting this, the safety laser scanner could be used to prevent the fast approach to 
the hazardous area of the work cell, because the longest detection distance to the 
protective field is 4 meters.  
 
𝑆 = (𝐾×(𝑇𝑚 + 𝑇𝑠)) + 𝑍𝑔 + 𝑍𝑟 + 𝐶 
Equation 2: Safety distance formula (ReeR 2015, 38.) 
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5 Summary and cogitation  
5.1 Future Prospects  
Collaborative robotics is nowadays a trendy field in industrial manufacturing and 
continues to rise its potential because of the continuously more flexible and custom-
izable production needs. The benefits of human-robot collaboration were introduced 
in the Introduction- section of this thesis. The developing and cheapening technol-
ogy enables, for example, the broader implementation of machine vision.  
With increasing industrial robot sales, inexpensive solutions with integrated safety 
will continue to be in the interest for small and medium sized companies. Integration 
of the most nowadays small force limited robots could be done by the workers by 
teaching the robot the motions by moving the robot’s arm by hand. This kind of 
programming will also be interest with bigger payload robots.   
Also, the development of ISO TS 15066 to a full standard is a foreseeable result 
from this direction of the technological development and the more generalizing ap-
plications in the market. 
5.2 Results 
This thesis gives the main guidelines for safety methods and introducesthe common 
technologies used for the safety of the human-robot collaboration in the industrial 
applications. Information was gathered from the newest standards and concepts 
and theapplications used by the manufacturers in the field of industry.  
The overall workflow was kept consistent with good help from the host company, 
host university and the home university. The time was limited and the original plan 
to have a real robot in the demonstration application was not possible, due to the 
tight reservation schedule for a suitable delta- application, but the needed function-
ality was represented with satisfaction. The more dynamic workflow in the example 
application could have been reached, if the safety laser scanner had included more 
field sets. 
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When deriving the final feedback, the technical investigation seemed to have met 
the needs of the host company. The necessary research was done and the example 
application was established the way agreed. Also the example architecture had 
been tested successfully.  
The thesis gives general information on the standards, technologies and example 
applications concerning the safety of the collaborative robotics in the industrial man-
ufacturing.  
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APPENDICES 
List of standards appeared in the thesis:  
ISO/TR 14121-2:2007 Safety of machinery – Risk assessment - Part 2: Practical 
guidance and examples of methods. 
SS-EN ISO 12100-1:2003 Safety of machinery – Basic concepts, general principles 
for design – Part 1: Basic terminology, methodology. 
DIN EN ISO 13849-1:2008-12 Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control 
systems – Part 1: General Principles for design.  
ISO 10218-1:2011 Robots and robotic devices – Safety requirements for industrial 
robots – Part 1: Robots 
ISO 10218-2:2011 Robots and robotic devices – Safety requirements for industrial 
robots – Part 2: Robot systems and integration 
ISO/TS 15066: 2016 Robots and robotic devices – Collaborative robots 
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Figure 40: SoSafe Programmable: Example architecture 2 program block 
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